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COMBATING PRIVATIZATION: MODIFYING
THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
FIDUCIARY PROGRAM TO PROTECT
INCOMPETENT VETERANS
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ABSTRACT
Created to supervise the distribution of Veterans Administration
benefits, the Veterans Benefit Administration Fiduciary Program was
designed to help thousands of incompetent veterans handle their
finances. Rather than directly managing each veteran’s funds, the
Fiduciary Program employs a privatization model whereby a private
individual or institution is appointed to manage a veteran’s assets. The
Fiduciary Program then monitors these fiduciaries to ensure the
veteran’s funds are properly expended.
This Note argues that in practice this privatization model is
seriously flawed and that it exposes some of the most vulnerable
portions of the veteran population’s funds to misuse. In support of
this conclusion, this Note compares the federal statutes, regulations,
and internal directives that govern the Fiduciary Program—paying
special attention to the Fiduciary Program Manual—with audits
performed by the Veterans Affairs Office of Audits and Evaluations
and the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Relying on these
audits, this inquiry rejects total reliance on substantive statutory
reform in light of legislative and judicial barriers. Instead, this Note
advocates for critical internal reforms designed to improve the
Program’s efficiency and functionality, the adoption of a state
enforcement mechanism, and reliance on principles of cooperative
federalism and interagency cooperation.
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INTRODUCTION
Billy Brown’s military service in Korea earned him benefits from
1
the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for life. To help Billy
Brown manage those benefits in his old age, the VA appointed
Marcus Brown (no relation), a cabinet maker with a high-school
diploma and no financial training, to serve as the veteran’s mandatory
2
personal-finance manager (fiduciary). Neither Billy Brown nor his
3
family had any input in Marcus Brown’s appointment. Once
appointed, Marcus Brown controlled all of Billy Brown’s income,
including his monthly VA checks and his life savings, which totaled
4
more than $100,000. In exchange for this service, the VA required
Billy Brown to pay Marcus Brown a portion of his VA check each
5
month.
The methods used to manage Billy Brown’s finances and the
finances of those similarly situated raise serious concerns about
fundamental fairness and functionality; in fact, those methods
threaten to undermine the core purpose of the VA—the protection of
vulnerable veterans. The VA faces an increasing array of challenges
resulting from insufficient resources, an overloaded system, and
6
never-before-seen hurdles. That said, solutions to these problems do
not uniformly require an outpouring of financial resources or an army
of staff. Indeed, as this Note argues, the VA’s Fiduciary Program
provides at least one example of a VA program that could instead
benefit from reforms focused on increased efficiency and oversight.

1. John Schwartz, Instead of Helping, Trustee Program Is Hurting Veterans, Families Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2011, at A16. For more information regarding the federal benefits awarded
to veterans, see generally U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR
VETERANS, DEPENDENTS AND SURVIVORS (2013), available at http://www.va.gov/opa/
publications/benefits_book/2013_Federal_Benefits_for_Veterans_English.pdf.
2. Schwartz, supra note 1. The VA’s Fiduciary Program defines a “fiduciary” as “a person
or legal entity (such as a bank) charged with the duty of managing the estate of an incompetent
beneficiary.” U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FIDUCIARY PROGRAM MANUAL, ch. 1,
§ A.4.e (2005), available at http://www.benefits.va.gov/FIDUCIARY/references.asp. VAsupervised fiduciaries can include either court-appointed fiduciaries or federal fiduciaries. Id.
3. Schwartz, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.; see U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § E.29 (authorizing
federal fiduciaries to collect fees).
6. See, e.g., Thomas J. Reed, Parallel Lines Never Meet: Why the Military Disability
Retirement and Veterans Affairs Department Claim Adjudication Systems Are a Failure, 19
WIDENER L.J. 57, 59−60 (2009) (addressing the systemic problems associated with distributing
VA benefits).
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The Fiduciary Program is a classic example of agency
privatization at work. In a world of limited resources, privatization—
the process by which a government agency uses “private means to
7
achieve public ends” —has become a permanent fixture in federal,
8
state, and local government. Federal law requires VA beneficiaries
deemed incapable of managing their personal finances due to injury,
9
disease, or infirmities of age to receive help managing their money.
To minimize the number of VA employees required to run the
Fiduciary Program, the VA instead either finds volunteers or uses the
veterans’ funds to hire private citizens or organizations to manage the
10
veterans’ finances. Government employees working for the VA then
monitor these private money managers to make sure they properly
11
handle the veterans’ funds. In theory, privatizing this system
increases the number of incompetent veterans receiving help while
simultaneously empowering the Fiduciary Program to shift from
administering the Program to monitoring fiduciaries.
Serving approximately one hundred thirty-four thousand
12
incompetent beneficiaries, the Fiduciary Program’s sole mission is to
provide oversight to ensure that incompetent veterans’ financial
13
resources are managed effectively. As it currently exists, however,
the Fiduciary Program inadequately protects incompetent
14
beneficiaries. The VA Office of the Inspector General (VA OIG)
7. Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 389 (2003).
8. Nestor M. Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare: The
Case of Housing, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 263 (2006).
9. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 41–42. Individuals entitled to
receive VA benefits are called beneficiaries. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2,
ch. 1, § A.4.c. Beneficiaries are classified as “minors,” “veterans,” and “other adults, including”
“helpless adults,” “surviving spouses,” “dependent parents, and” “insurance proceeds
recipients.” Id.
10. See 38 U.S.C. § 5502(a)(1) (2006) (“Where it appears to the Secretary [of Veterans
Affairs] that the interest of the beneficiary would be served thereby, payment of benefits under
any law administered by the Secretary may be made directly to the beneficiary or to a relative
or some other fiduciary for the use and benefit of the beneficiary, regardless of any legal
disability on the part of the beneficiary.”).
11. See 38 C.F.R. § 13.100(a) (2013) (authorizing Veterans Service Center Managers
(VSCMs) to supervise fiduciaries).
12. VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ANNUAL BENEFITS
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 41 (2013), available at http://www.vba.va.gov/REPORTS/
abr/2012_abr.pdf.
13. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 41.
14. The VA OIG is the investigative arm of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and its
Office of Audits and Evaluations is designed to “provide[] independent evaluations of VA’s
activities in order to ensure the integrity of [VA operations].” About the Office of Audits and
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concluded in 2010 that the Fiduciary Program was inadequate and
posed a threat to “approximately $161 million” belonging to veterans
15
or their families. Unfavorable reports from the VA OIG triggered
further inquiry by the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs in
16
2003. Since 2003, various subcommittees within the House
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs have held three additional hearings
seeking to pressure the VA to address the Fiduciary Program’s
17
shortcomings. And in 2010, after separately reviewing the Fiduciary
Program’s performance, the Government Accountability Office
18
(GAO) confirmed the VA OIG’s reports. In light of these findings,
the House of Representatives passed a bill amending the framework
of the Fiduciary Program to better protect incompetent veterans in
19
2012. But despite budding legislative change, critical reports, and
Evaluations, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.gov/oig/about/audit.asp (last visited
Feb. 9, 2014).
15. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, NO. 0901999-120, VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: AUDIT OF THE FIDUCIARY PROGRAM’S
EFFECTIVENESS IN ADDRESSING POTENTIAL MISUSE OF BENEFICIARY FUNDS 10−14 (2010).
The Fiduciary Program’s shortcomings originally came to the attention of the VA OIG in 2003
following a routine investigation of several VA regional offices. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, NO. 04-00034-141, COMBINED ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
REVIEW OF THE VA REGIONAL OFFICE: DETROIT, MICHIGAN i–ii, 1−2 (2004).
16. Department of Veterans Affairs’ Fiduciary Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Benefits of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (statement of Rep. Henry
Brown, Chairman, Subcomm. on Benefits).
17. Legislative Hearing on H.R. 2985, H.R. 3730, H.R. 4481, H.R. 5948: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112th Cong.
(2012) [hereinafter Legislative Hearing]; Reforming VA’s Flawed Fiduciary System: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112th
Cong. (2012) [hereinafter Reforming VA’s Flawed Fiduciary System]; see Examining the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs Fiduciary Program: How Can VA Better Protect Vulnerable
Veterans and Their Families?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance & Mem’l
Affairs of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. 2–3 (2010) [hereinafter Examining the
Fiduciary Program] (statement of Rep. John J. Hall, Chairman, Subcomm. on Disability
Assistance & Mem’l Affairs) (outlining some of the concerns raised by the VA OIG and the
Government Accountability Office (GAO)).
18. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-678, INCAPACITATED
ADULTS: OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL FIDUCIARIES AND COURT-APPOINTED GUARDIANS
NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321761.pdf
[hereinafter GAO, INCAPACITATED ADULTS] (identifying deficiencies in the Fiduciary
Program and areas for improvement); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-241,
VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM: IMPROVED COMPLIANCE AND POLICIES COULD BETTER
SAFEGUARD VETERANS’ BENEFITS (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
310/301237.pdf [hereinafter GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM] (recommending additional
oversight, monitoring, and training of fiduciaries).
19. H.R. 5948, 112th Cong. (2012); see H.R. REP. NO. 112-678, at 13−16 (2012) (describing
the purposes of the bill). For a discussion of this amendment, see Part III.A.
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20

other calls to action, the amendment stalled in the Senate in 2012.
Although an almost identical bill was revived for the 113th legislative
21
session, the amended legislation is currently awaiting a full vote of
22
the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs.
Given such widely identified deficiencies and to-date
unsuccessful attempts to remedy them, this Note seeks to chart a new
course in thinking about how to best reform the Fiduciary Program.
23
In so doing, it makes two contributions to existing legal scholarship.
First, it seeks to navigate the framework of rules and regulations that
govern the Fiduciary Program to provide insight for those trying to
help incompetent veterans assert their legal rights. Second, this Note
argues that effective reform of the Fiduciary Program requires critical
internal reforms, the adoption of a state enforcement mechanism, and
reliance on principles of cooperative federalism and interagency
cooperation. In arguing for these reforms, this approach stands in
stark contrast to another proposed solution: total reliance on
substantive statutory reform. Such reform, this Note submits, cannot
overcome the political hurdles or enforcement issues inherent in
social-welfare programs without the aid of the courts. Judicial review,
moreover, provides an unsatisfactory avenue for beneficiaries to
vindicate their rights; federal law limits their available judicial forum
to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC), which is
plagued by insufficient judicial resources and numerous jurisdictional
hurdles.
This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I provides an overview
of the Fiduciary Program, explaining how the Program works in
theory. Part II examines the Program’s identifiable flaws through an
examination of three critical problems. Part III identifies why a new
th

20. See H.R. 5948 (112 ): Veterans Fiduciary Reform and Honoring Noble Service Act,
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr5948#overview (last visited Feb. 9,
2014).
21. H.R. 894, 113th Cong. (2013).
22. H.R. 894: To Amend Title 38, United States Code, To Improve the Supervision of
Fiduciaries of Veterans Under the Laws Administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr894 (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
23. Although there has been no scholarship on the Fiduciary Program, there have been a
few articles written about the Representative Payment Program, the Social Security
Administration’s (SSA) version of the Fiduciary Program. See generally Margaret G. Farrell,
Administrative Paternalism: Social Security’s Representative Payment Program and Two Models
of Justice, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 283 (1992); Margaret G. Farrell, Doing unto Others: A
Proposal for Participatory Justice in Social Security’s Representative Payment Program, 53 U.
PITT. L. REV. 883 (1992); Samuel Saks, Representative Payment Under the Social Security
Protection Act of 2004, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1569 (2005).
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statutory scheme cannot effectively respond to the Fiduciary
Program’s challenges in light of the limitations on judicial review.
Part IV proposes alternative mechanisms for reform including
interagency cooperation, parallel state enforcement, and vigorous
advocacy by individuals.
I. THE FIDUCIARY PROGRAM ON PAPER
24

Originally created in 1935, the Fiduciary Program, managed
under the Veterans Benefit Administration (VBA) division of the
25
VA, protects the benefits of those whom the VA deems incapable of
26
managing their personal finances. Once the VA determines a
beneficiary is unable to manage his or her financial affairs, the
beneficiary is deemed incompetent and the Fiduciary Program
appoints a private citizen or organization as the incompetent
27
beneficiary’s fiduciary. Once appointed, the fiduciary is responsible
for ensuring that the veteran’s funds are expended for “the care,
support, welfare and needs of the beneficiary and their recognized
28
dependents.” In fiscal year 2012, the Fiduciary Program included
24. Act of Aug. 12, 1935, ch. 510, 49 Stat. 607.
25. The Fiduciary Program is “administered by VA Regional Offices (VAROs) and their
respective Offices of Regional Counsel (ORC) that deal directly with VA beneficiaries and
State courts in guardianship and commitment matters.” OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS,
supra note 15, at 1; see 38 U.S.C. § 5502(a)(1) (2006) (authorizing the payment of benefits to
fiduciaries “for the use and benefit of [beneficiaries]”); see also id. § 512 (authorizing the
Secretary of Veterans Affairs to delegate that authority to lower-level employees). The
Secretary of the VA delegates his authority to appoint fiduciaries to the VSCM at each regional
office. 38 C.F.R. § 13.55 (2013).
26. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 41–42. The Fiduciary Program not
only serves veterans but also protects all incompetent beneficiaries. For the Program’s
definition of “beneficiary,” see supra note 9.
27. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 39. Federal law empowers the VA
to appoint a private citizen to manage a veteran’s finances. See 38 U.S.C. § 5502(a)(1) (“Where
it appears to the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] that the interest of the beneficiary would be
served thereby, payment of benefits under any law administered by the Secretary may be made
directly to the beneficiary or to a relative or some other fiduciary for the use and benefit of the
beneficiary, regardless of any legal disability on the part of the beneficiary.”); see also 38 C.F.R.
§ 13.55(a) (describing the different types of federal fiduciaries, including legal custodians and
institutional payees). Although the Fiduciary Program guidelines do not explicitly reference the
appointment of private individuals to serve as paid fiduciaries, the fact that “dependents or
close relatives” are generally not allowed to receive a commission, combined with the regular
use of commissions, implies that private individuals and institutions can be appointed as paid
fiduciaries. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § E.29.b.
28. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS,
DEPENDENTS AND SURVIVORS 39 (2012), available at http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/
benefits_book/2012_federal_benefits_ebook_final.pdf.
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134,128 beneficiaries receiving a total of $2,337,816,110 in VA
29
benefits.
Because the Fiduciary Program involves money management for
individuals extremely susceptible to abuse, there is ample opportunity
30
for misuse. To protect these vulnerable beneficiaries, federal law
establishes minimum threshold requirements related to the selection
31
and monitoring of VA fiduciaries. The VA provides further
guidance through regulations that flesh out the federal
32
requirements. In addition, the VBA, the subset of the VA
responsible for administering the Fiduciary Program, routinely issues
33
34
further guidance in the form of fast letters, training letters, and
35
manuals. This guidance details the Fiduciary Program’s internal
processes and functions and is instrumental in the daily
36
administration of the Fiduciary Program. In practice, fast letters
“introduce new laws before they become regulations,” “adjust
guidance from the [VBA Fiduciary Manual (the Manual)] with
29. VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 12, at 41. By categorizing the data based on
the type of fiduciary retained by each beneficiary, the Benefits Report fails to account for
fiduciaries providing services to multiple veterans. As such, the Benefits Report does not
identify the actual number of fiduciaries in the system.
30. Cf. Saks, supra note 23, at 1578–79 (discussing the dangers inherent to a beneficiary
under the SSA’s fiduciary program).
31. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 5507(a)(1)(C) (requiring a credit report for proposed fiduciaries to
the extent practicable); id. § 5507(b) (requiring investigators to inquire into a proposed
fiduciary’s criminal background).
32. See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 13.105 (indicating which types of fiduciaries may be required to
provide bonds).
33. Fast letters are written and published by the Director of the Fiduciary Program and
transmit information and instructions to local VA offices about changes or policies relating to
the Fiduciary Program. Jeffrey Parker, Two Perspectives on Legal Authority Within the
Department of Veterans Affairs Adjudication, 1 VETERANS L. REV. 208, 210 n.21 (2009). For
examples of fast letters, see Garcia v. Shinseki, No. 11-1924, 2011 WL 4448186, at 3–4 & n.3
(Vet. App. Sept. 27, 2011); Fast Letter 13-29, Fiscal Year 2014 National Training Curriculum for
Fiduciary Hub and Manila Office Fiduciary Personnel (Nov. 14, 2013), available at
https://www.ttande.org/VBA_Learning_Catalog/Pension/FL/FL13-029_SOP.doc; Fast Letter 0411, Processing Claims Releasing Retroactive Benefits to Beneficiaries Under Fiduciary
Supervision (May 17, 2011), available at http://www.legion.org/documents/legion/
pdf/VA&R_Bulletin_4_11_11.pdf; References, Fast Letters and Forms, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS
AFF., http://benefits.va.gov/fiduciary/references.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
34. For an example of a training letter, see Training Letter 11-04, From Thomas J. Murphy,
Dir., Compensation Serv., Veterans Benefits Admin., to All VA Regional Offices, Processing
Virtual VA Electronic VA Form 21-592, Request for Appointment of a Fiduciary, Custodian, or
Guardian, Documents (Sept. 20, 2011), available at http://www.vfwilserviceoffice.com/upload/
TL%2011-04%20Fidicuary%20Processing.doc.
35. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2.
36. Parker, supra note 33, at 210 & n.19.
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pending changes,” and “co-ordinate action between divisions in a
37
regional office.” Fast letters are easy to issue and revoke, providing
38
the Program with substantial flexibility. These directives, however,
39
may not be considered binding law, making it difficult to hold
Fiduciary Program employees accountable for following or failing to
40
follow the issued directives.
Setting aside numerous nuances and qualifications beyond the
scope of this Note, the structure of the Fiduciary Program is fairly
straightforward: After determining that a veteran is incapable of
41
managing his or her personal finances, the Fiduciary Program
assigns an employee (the investigator) to select a fiduciary for the
42
veteran. The investigator interviews the beneficiary and any
potential applicants for the position of fiduciary before making a
43
selection. If the investigator determines that no suitable fiduciary is
available to serve for free, a portion of the beneficiary’s money can be
44
used to pay a fiduciary to manage the beneficiary’s finances.
37. N.D. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, TRAINING, RESPONSIBILITY, INVOLVEMENT, AND
PREPARATION OF CLAIMS, ch. 3, at 10, available at http://www.nd.gov/veterans/files/resource/
Chapter%203%20-%20Reference%20Materials.pdf.
38. Parker, supra note 33, at 217; see, e.g., Fast Letter 12-13, From David R. McLenachen,
Dir., Pension and Fiduciary Servs., Veterans Benefits Admin., to All Veterans Service Center
and Fiduciary Hubs Personnel, Pre-approval of Single Expenditures by a Fiduciary (Apr. 19,
2012), available at http://benefits.va.gov/fiduciary/FL12-013.doc (rescinding Fast Letter 09-42,
which had been issued in October 2009, and clarifying the expenditure-review policy outlined in
the Manual).
39. See 38 C.F.R. § 19.5 (“In consideration of appeals, the Board [of Veterans’
Appeals] . . . is not bound by Department manuals, circulars, or similar administrative issues.”).
40. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 196–203.
41. See 38 C.F.R. § 13.55(a) (limiting the use of fiduciaries to those beneficiaries who are
physically or legally disabled). Although determining a beneficiary’s competence is a source of
substantial controversy, this Note focuses exclusively on the administration of the Fiduciary
Program after the determination of competence is made.
42. See 38 U.S.C. § 5507(a)(2) (2006) (endowing the VA with broad discretion to
determine whether the proposed fiduciary’s certification is “in the interest of [the]
beneficiary”).
43. See id. (requiring face-to-face interviews with beneficiaries and fiduciaries when
practicable). Waiver of an in-person examination is only acceptable when a proposed fiduciary
is a state or local government agency that is already serving as a VA fiduciary with a recent
history of compliance with VA policy (for example, by timely filing their accountings). U.S.
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § D.11.m.
44. 38 U.S.C. § 5502(a)(2). Necessity exists only when “the beneficiary’s best interest
would be served by the appointment of a qualified professional, or, if a qualified professional is
not available, the proposed fiduciary is the only qualified person available and is not willing to
serve without a fee.” 38 C.F.R. § 13.64(a). Only approximately 8 percent of all beneficiaries pay
a commission. Stephen Spotswood, Recent Investigations Question VA’s Paid Fiduciary Program
for Disabled Veterans, U.S. MED., Mar. 2012, at 6.
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The investigator has wide discretion in selecting a fiduciary, but
there are a few federal laws involved in the selection process: The
45
investigator must review a proposed fiduciary’s recent credit report,
46
check his or her criminal history, and provide “adequate evidence”
that the proposed fiduciary’s selection is in the interest of the
beneficiary (though what constitutes “adequate evidence” is largely
47
undefined). The investigator also decides whether to protect the
48
veteran’s funds using a bond. Once selected, the fiduciary is
responsible for ensuring that the beneficiary has basic necessities
including food, shelter, and medical expenses. The fiduciary is also
responsible for paying all bills and income taxes on time, collecting
any rent or unpaid debts on behalf of the beneficiary, and purchasing
49
insurance if needed. After selection, a different employee (the
auditor) monitors the fiduciary’s spending through periodic financial

45. See 38 U.S.C. § 5507(a)(1)(C) (requiring the VA to determine the fitness of the
proposed fiduciary by reviewing a credit report, issued within one year of the date of the
proposed appointment to the extent practicable). Credit scores are widely regarded as a useful
indicator of financial responsibility, providing important “information about one’s responsibility
and stability, stress level, and distractibility” to create an accurate picture of the individual’s
risk-assessment behavior. Patrick L. Brockett & Linda L. Golden, Biological and
Psychobehavioral Correlates of Credit Scores and Automobile Insurance Losses: Toward an
Explication of Why Credit Scoring Works, 74 J. RISK & INS. 23, 26 (2007).
46. See 38 U.S.C. § 5507(b) (mandating that the VA inquire whether the proposed
fiduciary has been convicted of any offense that resulted in imprisonment for more than one
year).
47. Id. § 5507(a)(2). In narrowing selection standards, VA regulations require all
determinations to be made based on the “best interest of the beneficiary.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.850
(emphasis added). Though the best-interest standard remains undefined, the Manual provides
specific instructions to help field examiners select the best fiduciary. U.S. DEP’T VETERANS
AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § E.28; see also Freeman v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 404, 416–17
(2011) (per curiam) (finding sufficient regulatory guidance to allow the court to review the
selection of fiduciaries).
48. See 38 U.S.C. § 5507(a)(3) (granting the VA discretion to require a bond). VA
regulations clarify which types of fiduciaries might be required to provide bonds. See 38 C.F.R.
§ 13.105(a) (listing “legal custodian, custodian-in-fact or chief officer of a [qualified] private
institution” as those federal fiduciaries that the VSCM may require to provide bonds). Bond
payments are made by the beneficiary’s estate. Examining the Fiduciary Program, supra note 17,
at 41 (statement of Gary Chesterson, Chief of Fiduciary Program Staff, Veterans Benefits
Administration, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs).
49. PENSION & FIDUCIARY SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, A GUIDE FOR VA
FIDUCIARIES 4 (2013), available at http://benefits.va.gov/FIDUCIARY/Fid_Guide.pdf; see also
Fiduciary, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., http://www.benefits.va.gov/fiduciary/fiduciary.asp (last
visited Feb. 9, 2014) (describing a fiduciary’s potential responsibilities).
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50

statements called accountings and periodic personal visits to the
51
beneficiary. The auditor is expected to “aggressive[ly]” follow up on
delinquent accountings to ensure the fiduciary is complying with
52
while simultaneously looking for
Fiduciary Program policy
53
indicators of misuse. If the fiduciary performs unsatisfactorily and
informal efforts by the local Veterans Service Center Manager
(VSCM) fail to correct the fiduciary’s deficiency, the case will be
54
referred to the VA Regional counsel. If a misuse determination is
made, the matter will be referred to the VA Office of Investigations
55
for further review. If the VA OIG finds “a prima facie case of
misappropriation, embezzlement or a violation of the Federal
statutes,” the case may be submitted to the U.S. Attorney’s office for
56
potential prosecution.
Several different punishments exist for failure to comply with
Program policy and/or misuse of funds. First, a Fiduciary Program
employee can terminate fiduciaries who misuse funds or fail to follow
Fiduciary Program rules and appoint a successor fiduciary at any
57
time. Additionally, under federal law, misappropriation and
embezzlement by a fiduciary is punishable by up to five years’
58
imprisonment. Beyond potential criminal prosecution, federal law
provides a cause of action for negligence against the government “in
any case in which the negligent failure of the Secretary to investigate
or monitor a fiduciary [resulted] in misuse of benefits by the
59
fiduciary.” If the VA is found negligent, federal law requires the VA
to “pay the beneficiary or the beneficiary’s successor fiduciary an
60
amount equal to the amount of benefits that were so misused.”

50. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 3, § C.7 (requiring
accountings for several different types of federal fiduciaries). Required accountings can be
waived for any federal fiduciary under appropriate circumstances. Id. ch. 2, § E.28.b.
51. See id. ch. 2, § E.33.c (detailing the timeline for secondary field examinations).
52. See id. ch. 3, §§ C.12.a–b (citing 38 U.S.C. § 6107) (providing a step-by-step table
describing the appropriate technique for handling delinquent accounts).
53. Id. ch. 2, § A.2.f. For guidance on misuse investigations, see generally id. ch. 5.
54. 38 C.F.R. § 13.100(c) (2013).
55. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 5, § F.18.
56. 38 C.F.R. § 13.100(d).
57. Id. § 13.100(a)(2).
58. 38 U.S.C. § 6101(a)(2) (2006).
59. Id. § 6107(a)(1). In this context, a negligent failure exists when the VA fails to review
an accounting or follow up an allegation of abuse within sixty days. Id. § 6107(a)(2).
60. Id. § 6107(a)(1).
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II. THE FIDUCIARY PROGRAM AS APPLIED
In practice, the Fiduciary Program struggles to effectively protect
vulnerable beneficiaries from abuse. A woman serving as a fiduciary
for her injured son recently described her experiences with the
Fiduciary Program as “disturbing,” citing among many problems a
complete lack of guidance about Fiduciary Program requirements,
difficulty contacting Program employees, and inconsistent reports as
61
to whether she had complied with Program procedures. According
to the Wounded Warrior Project, a charity supporting wounded
veterans, her description is an accurate reflection of community
62
experiences.
Rather than exhaustively detailing the Program’s flaws, this Note
highlights three major problems illustrative of the Program’s
shortcomings as a whole. First, the Fiduciary Program assigns
63
unsuitable fiduciaries. Second, fiduciaries are not always required to
64
fulfill the mandatory bond requirement. Third, the Program’s staff
65
routinely fails to identify abuse.
A. The Selection of Inappropriate and Incompetent Fiduciaries
66

67

68

Investigations, hearings, and media reports have identified
many instances in which either inadequate or inappropriate
fiduciaries have been assigned to incompetent beneficiaries. These
problems manifest themselves in at least three ways. First,
investigators hire strangers despite the availability of willing and
qualified family members. Second, unqualified fiduciaries apply for
positions as paid fiduciaries. Third, technology limits the Program’s
ability to identify potentially abusive fiduciaries.
First, the Fiduciary Program inappropriately assigns paid
strangers to serve as fiduciaries instead of selecting capable family
members willing to serve for free. For example, Billy Brown, the
61. Reforming VA’s Flawed Fiduciary System, supra note 17, at 26–27 (statement of Pam
Estes, Veteran Fiduciary).
62. Id. at 60–62 (statement of the Wounded Warrior Project).
63. See infra Part II.A.
64. See infra Part II.B.
65. See infra Part II.C.
66. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
68. E.g., Schwartz, supra note 1; Bill Murphy, Jr., VA Fiduciary Program Comes Under
Fire, STRIPES CENT. (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.stripes.com/blogs/stripes-central/stripes-central1.8040/va-fiduciary-program-comes-under-fire-1.140500.

BOSWORTH IN PP (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

1514

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/16/2014 8:21 PM

[Vol. 63:1503

veteran assigned a cabinet maker as a paid fiduciary, had an adult son
who already possessed a power of attorney for the veteran and was
69
willing to serve as his fiduciary for free. In another example, a
Fiduciary Program employee selected a third party as a fiduciary over
a retired lieutenant colonel’s daughter who had a valid durable
financial power of attorney and had managed the veteran’s finances
70
for more than ten years.
These seemingly absurd results are largely explained by several
71
factors. First, in the face of minimal regulatory guidance, the Manual
affords VA employees substantial discretion in selecting a fiduciary.
It states that the employee assigned to select the fiduciary must
determine “the type of fiduciary relationship that will best serve the
72
needs of the beneficiary.” The Manual then lists the various types of
73
fiduciaries without creating a hierarchy and later, buried in the
section on commissions, notes that commission should not be
authorized when another qualified fiduciary is willing to serve
74
without pay. This substantial discretion leads to questionable results
75
in the practice of selecting fiduciaries. The Director of Pension and
Fiduciary Services has told the House Committee on Veterans’
Affairs that employees are required to follow an order of preference
when selecting a fiduciary: (1) the beneficiary’s preference; (2) the
beneficiary’s spouse, if available; (3) a family member, friend, or
other individual willing to serve without a fee; and (4) a paid
69. Schwartz, supra note 1.
70. See Solze v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 118, 119 (2013) (per curiam).
71. Cf. 38 C.F.R. § 3.850 (2013) (requiring that “[p]ayments of benefits” to incompetent
beneficiaries be made “to a duly recognized fiduciary . . . when it is determined to be in the best
interest of the beneficiary”); id. § 13.55 (“The Veterans Service Center Manager is authorized to
select or appoint . . . the person or legal entity best suited to receive Department of Veterans
Affairs benefits in a fiduciary capacity for a beneficiary who is . . . incompetent . . . .”); id § 13.58
(“In absence of special circumstances, the person or legal entity to be appointed legal custodian
will be the person or legal entity caring for and/or having custody of the beneficiary or the
beneficiary’s estate.”).
72. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § E.26.a.
73. Id. ch. 2, § E.28.
74. Id. ch. 2, § E.29.b. A commission cannot exceed 4 percent of a veteran’s annual VA
benefits payment. Id.
75. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1, at A16 (“Families of veterans like Mr. Brown, 80, and
William E. Freeman, whose sister was denied the ability to manage his benefits, and
beneficiaries like Dennis Keyser, whose appointed trustee turned out to be a felon, say the
system is badly flawed.”); Legion Critiques VA Fiduciary Program, AM. LEGION (Feb. 10, 2012),
http://www.legion.org/legislative/161404/legion-critiques-va-fiduciary-program
(“In
one
example, VA denied the request of one man to be appointed as his father’s fiduciary—although
he already had power of attorney.”).
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76

stranger. This requirement, however, is not explicitly provided for in
77
the Manual. Additionally, last updated in 2005, the current Manual
does not incorporate any of the modern changes or modifications
made to the Program. Instead, many changes come in the form of fast
letters, which override one another to constantly change the rules
78
governing the Program.
Second, selection is further complicated when unqualified
fiduciaries apply for positions as paid fiduciaries. Potential fiduciaries’
criminal or financial backgrounds may render them unsuitable to
serve as a financial guardian for vulnerable beneficiaries. For
example, one report indicates that, despite previously pleading guilty
to eight counts of tax fraud while working for the Internal Revenue
Service, a convicted felon was appointed as a paid fiduciary for a
79
disabled beneficiary. His unlawful selection is likely explained by
inadequacies in the criminal-background-inquiry process. During the
selection process, the Manual requires the investigator, by way of a
criminal background check, to request that the potential fiduciary
“sign a statement as to whether he or she has been convicted of any
offense under Federal or State law that resulted in imprisonment for
80
more than one year.” Nothing in the Manual, however, requires the
76. Legislative Hearing, supra note 17, at 35 (statement of David McLenachen, Director of
Pension and Fiduciary Service, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs); see also U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS: DEPENDENTS AND SURVIVORS 41
(2013),
available
at
http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/benefits_book/2013_Federal_
Benefits_for_Veterans_English.pdf (stating that the VA will only consider a paid fiduciary “as a
last resort”).
77. The Fiduciary Manual was last updated in July 2005. See References, Fast Letters and
Forms, supra note 33. The Compensation and Pension Manual Rewrite, however, in which the
current Fiduciary Manual was previously published, has been updated as part of the VA’s
ongoing Rewrite Project, which “focus[es] on rewriting the regulations concerning the
department’s compensation and pension benefit program.” William L. Pine & William F. Russo,
Making Veterans’ Benefits Clear: The Regulation Rewrite Project, FED. LAW., July 2010, at 38,
39; see also M21-1MR Compensation and Pension Manual Rewrite, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, http://www.benefits.va.gov/WARMS/M21_1MR.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
78. See supra note 38.
79. Jennifer Kraus, VA Hired Convicted Felon To Manage Veterans’ Money,
NEWSCHANNEL5.COM (Feb. 21, 2011, 7:21 PM), http://www.newschannel5.com/story/14071970/
va-hires-convicted-felon-to-manage-veterans-money.
80. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § D.11.g. In contrast, according
to the Society for Human Resource Management, 93 percent of employers pay for criminal
background checks from checking companies for some prospective applicants, and 73 percent
purchase criminal background checks for all potential applicants. PERSIS S. YU & SHARON M.
DIETRICH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., BROKEN RECORDS: HOW ERRORS BY CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKING COMPANIES HARM WORKERS AND BUSINESSES 7 (2012), available
at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/broken-records-report.pdf.
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field examiner to verify the fiduciary’s truthfulness with a neutral
81
third party, making it fairly easy for the applicant to conceal a
criminal past. Moreover, because the potential fiduciary is only
required to report convictions resulting in more than one year of
82
imprisonment, lesser crimes of financial dishonesty need not be
reported despite their particular relevance when selecting a fiduciary.
This is especially troubling considering that many states are
increasing the threshold dollar amount required to trigger
imprisonment for financial crimes, such as theft and check kiting, to
83
avoid costly prison terms. Under the current guidelines, small-time
fraudsters can honestly complete the background check without
bringing their past indiscretions to the investigator’s attention.
Third, technology also limits the Program’s ability to identify
potentially abusive fiduciaries. The Fiduciary Benefit System (FBS),
the electronic case-management software intended to facilitate the
84
bulk of day-to-day operations in the Fiduciary Program, “lacks an
external interface for fiduciaries, beneficiaries and other external
85
entities.” As a result, the system cannot process electronically
submitted accounting information or access financial institutions to
verify account balances. This system drastically increases the
potential for error as auditors must manually review the accountings
for math errors and cross-reference the accountings with data
separately provided by financial institutions to verify that the
86
balances provided are accurate. Additionally, FBS does not retain a
list of fiduciaries replaced due to misuse, making it difficult to track
87
fiduciaries to ensure that no new beneficiaries are assigned to them.

81. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § D.11 (discussing criminal
history inquiries and noting no neutral third-party requirement).
82. Id. ch. 2, § D.11.h. The Manual states that a criminal background statement can be
waived “where immediate payment is made to the parent of a minor beneficiary.” Id. ch. 2,
§ D.11.g.
83. Kevin Johnson, Some States Rethink Felony Property Crimes, USA TODAY (Oct. 30,
2011, 9:55 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-10-30/statesrethink-felony-property-crimes/51008424/1.
84. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 7–8.
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 9.
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B. Failure To Secure a Surety Bond
In addition to struggling to select appropriate fiduciaries, the
Fiduciary Program routinely fails to ensure that estates worth more
than $20,000 are bonded when appropriate. The Manual explicitly
88
requires the Fiduciary Program to consider a corporate surety bond
or other method of protection for paid fiduciaries managing estates
89
valued in excess of $20,000. When the investigator determines a
surety bond is not required, the Manual requires that the reason for
deeming this protection unnecessary be documented in a report and
90
filed with the beneficiary’s claim. Moreover, when a bond is
required, the Manual places a positive duty on the Fiduciary Program
91
investigator to help the fiduciary secure the appropriate bond.
Despite these clear requirements, the 2010 audit conducted by
the VA OIG found that no method of protection (or reason for the
lack of protection) existed for 86 percent of estates exceeding
92
$20,000. Additionally, despite a clear requirement that benefit
payments must be held until a bond or other adequate control is in
93
place, in one office two investigators authorized the release of
$571,256 in funds without providing the appropriate protection or a
94
documented justification for the lapse. Corroborating the VA OIG’s
findings, the GAO identified at least two cases involving estates
worth $82,000 and $62,000, respectively, with no documentation of a
95
bond or a waiver in the file.
There are several explanations for investigators’ routine failure
to secure a bond. First, investigators and auditors lack experience and
training. For instance, when asked why they failed to follow the
Fiduciary Program’s policy regarding bonds, investigators cited
uncertainty “about what types of bonds are required for certain types

88. In this context, surety bonds provide a private remedy for beneficiaries harmed by
fiduciaries’ misuse. James A. Black, Jr., Miscellaneous Surety Bonds and the Restatement, 34
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195, 1196 (1993).
89. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § E.28.i.
90. Id.
91. Id. If the examiner considers a bond unnecessary, the report must document the
reason. When a bond is considered necessary, VA payments cannot be made to the fiduciary
until the bond is in place. Id.
92. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 9.
93. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § E.28.i.
94. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 10.
95. GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 11–12.
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96

of fiduciaries.” Investigators and auditors also possess substantial
discretion. Although the Manual states that investigators must
consider a surety bond or other method of protection for these high97
value estates, bonds are not required. As a result, investigators
frequently waive the requirement without providing justifications, or
98
they authorize the acquisition of inadequate bonds. Moreover, the
99
Fiduciary Program does not provide a list of approved sureties,
requiring only that the bonding authority be recognized in the state of
100
jurisdiction. This leaves an investigator with substantial discretion to
select the appropriate surety.
Technological constraints also play a large role in the Program’s
inability to track surety bonds. The FBS is painfully out-of-date. The
Program cannot record surety-bond values or other types of
accounting information such as benefit amounts, spending, or account
101
balances, making it nearly impossible for management to keep track
of which fiduciaries have surety bonds. Additionally, FBS cannot
interface with other VA programs, including the Veterans Service
102
Network (VETSNET), requiring staff to manually search for
103
impending retroactive disability payments. This limitation can result
in the release of large payments to fiduciaries without the
104
establishment of proper safeguards.

96. Id. at 12.
97. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § E.28.i (indicating that
investigators may consider “other method[s] of protection” in place of a bond and that, in some
instances, protection may not be necessary).
98. See GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 11 (“Our nationwide sample
showed that program staff sometimes failed to obtain proof that a fiduciary purchased a bond,
when required, or did not adequately document in the beneficiary case files that the bond
requirement was waived.”); see also OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 9
(noting that 86 percent of the beneficiary estates exceeding $20,000 lacked withdrawal
agreements or surety bonds).
99. Approved sureties are those who have complied with the law and regulation of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and are listed by the Treasury as an authorized bonding
company. See Surety Companies Doing Business with the United States, 31 C.F.R. § 223.1–223.3
(2013).
100. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 3, § E.23.b.
101. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 9.
102. VETSNET is the system used to store information about veterans benefits. See
Veterans Service Network Corporate Mini Master File (VETSNET File), U.S. DEP’T VETERANS
AFF., http://www.virec.research.va.gov/VETSNET/Overview.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
103. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 10.
104. Id.
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C. Inability To Identify Misuse
The biggest problem with the Fiduciary Program, however, is the
failure to effectively identify abuses. Joe Phillips, for example,
managed twenty-eight veterans’ accounts for more than twenty-five
years without receiving even one VA audit, allowing him to steal
105
more than $2 million from beneficiaries. Similarly, Hazel Diane Hill
controlled sixteen veterans’ finances under the Fiduciary Program
106
and embezzled $62,000 from three of them. Unlike Phillips,
however, no audit caught Hill, who actually turned herself in as a
107
result of feelings of guilt.
The failure to identify misuse is partially a result of the failure to
efficiently examine financial reports. Program employees routinely
struggle to hold fiduciaries responsible for failing to meet financial
108
reporting deadlines. In fact, Fiduciary Program staff at three of the
five VAROs surveyed failed to follow up on 63 percent of delinquent
109
reports at those three offices. In one particularly egregious instance,
a fiduciary submitted a financial report two years late without
110
receiving a reprimand. In another case, the VA OIG identified a
single fiduciary still serving four beneficiaries despite multiple
allegations of misuse and seriously delinquent accountings for all
111
beneficiaries, ranging from 134 to 215 days late. Because the
Fiduciary Program routinely fails to appropriately follow up on
delinquent financial reports, millions of dollars belonging to
112
incompetent veterans are exposed to possible misappropriation.
The Fiduciary Program is particularly ineffective at addressing
allegations of misuse. For example, the VA OIG found that staff
failed to timely respond to misuse allegations in 96 percent of the
105. Eric Nalder & Lise Olsen, Investigation: Some Vets’ Money Managed—and Stolen—by
Scoundrels, HOUS. CHRON., June 17, 2012, at A1.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 10 (showing that in a
majority of the case files examined, auditors failed to follow up or document the follow-up on
time). The VA OIG found active fiduciaries with accounts delinquent by up to 710 days. OFFICE
OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 3.
109. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 3.
110. GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 11.
111. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 5.
112. See id. at 6 (“When VBA fails to take appropriate actions in a timely manner to replace
fiduciaries that are responsible for multiple delinquent accountings, beneficiary estates are put
at risk, and the potential for misuse or inappropriate diversion of beneficiary funds is
increased.”).
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113

In one instance, a regional office failed to
cases reviewed.
investigate a fiduciary despite allegations from field examiners and a
114
third party that the fiduciary may have misused funds. When the
VA does follow up on misuse reports, responses are extremely
delayed, taking, on average, an extra eighty-one days to complete an
115
investigation.
Once an investigation report is completed, the
timeliness of the determination decision is spotty; in cases in which
the VA OIG issued late determinations, the total average time taken
116
to complete the determinations was ninety-nine days. The extent of
the delay is especially troubling because the Manual specifies that the
misuse-response process, which includes both investigation and
117
determination, should only take seventy-five days total. Because of
delays among field examiners and auditors, the Fiduciary Program
118
takes an average of thirty-two months to catch thieving fiduciaries.
These performance delays are partially attributable to unrealistic
expectations. Despite internal aspirations to meet 90 percent of
119
120
deadlines, that delays often occur, sometimes egregiously, suggests
121
that current performance expectations may be impractical.
Unrealistic performance standards distort the priorities of the
employees, decrease performance quality, and incentivize staff to
122
bend standards to meet deadlines. Moreover, some investigators

113. Id. at 6.
114. Id. at 7.
115. See id. at 6 (noting that the average inspection took 126 days to complete); cf. U.S.
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 5, § A.1.e (requiring that investigations occur
within 45 days of the assignment for investigation).
116. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 6–7. The Manual requires that
determinations occur within thirty days of the completed investigation. U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 5, § A.1.e. In its case study of misuse allegations, the VA
OIG found that 25 percent of cases never received a determination, 45 percent of the
determinations were completed in a timely fashion, and 30 percent of the determinations were
delayed by four to 175 days beyond the thirty-day requirement. See OFFICE OF AUDITS &
EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 6–7.
117. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 5, § A.1.e.
118. Nalder & Olsen, supra note 105.
119. GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 12.
120. See supra notes 109–18 and accompanying text.
121. Cf. Examining the Fiduciary Program, supra note 17, at 22–23 (statement of Katherine
R. Pflanz, Field Examiner, Winston-Salem Veterans Affairs Regional Office) (discussing
problems with performance measures in other programs under the VBA).
122. Cf. CNA ANALYSIS & SOLUTIONS, QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF VBA EMPLOYEE
WORK CREDIT AND WORK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 30−31 (2009), available at
http://www.veteranslawlibrary.com/files/Commission_Reports/CNA_work_credit_analysis_Nov
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and auditors travel long distances to hold in-person interviews with
beneficiaries and fiduciaries, making it onerous to conduct timely
123
visits.
Outdated technology also shares some of the blame for the
Program’s failure to follow up on delinquent financial reports and
address misuse allegations. The FBS substantially limits the daily
functions of the Fiduciary Program, as the software accepts only one
due date for a financial report (thereby overriding older due dates
when a report has not been submitted), provides no means of
comparing monthly or yearly budgets to actual expenditures, and
124
cannot accept or process electronically submitted documents. FBS
data field limitations also prevent staff from recording all pertinent
information regarding beneficiaries or fiduciaries within the
125
software. To compensate, staff manually track such dates using
126
personal notes to remind themselves of pending actions, which
inevitably creates inefficiencies and substantial room for error.
The FBS also makes it difficult for management to monitor
employees. The software does not generate a single management
127
report showing staff deadlines. Instead, managers must physically
cross-reference several reports to determine monthly deadlines, a
128
task requiring considerable time and experience. The FBS also
provides no efficient means of monitoring staff performance because
the Program only stores two months of production data: the current
129
month and the previous month. As a result, to analyze a particular
employee’s performance, managers must manually evaluate the
individual’s performance for each month under review and then
130
compare those to an employee’s overall performance, an extremely
taxing analysis.
2009.pdf (noting that unrealistic performance expectations are present in the VBA more
generally).
123. Examining the Fiduciary Program, supra note 17, at 51 (statement of Daniel Bertoni,
Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security, U.S. Government Accountability
Office).
124. See GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 14–15. This forces fiduciaries
to submit their annual reports by mail. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at
10.
125. GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 14–15.
126. Id. at 15.
127. Id. at 16.
128. See id. (describing the process as one “which can be cumbersome”).
129. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 21–22.
130. GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 16.
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III. BEYOND TRADITIONAL REFORM: THE PROBLEMS WITH
COMPREHENSIVE STATUTORY REFORM
Despite numerous reports indicating that the Fiduciary Program
needs substantial reform, successful reform has not yet occurred.
Critics of an agency’s performance might turn to the legislative or
131
judicial branch for relief. Congressional adoption of a more explicit
statutory scheme to regulate the Fiduciary Program would likely
encounter hurdles to effective, meaningful judicial review. To explain,
this Note first examines why a new statutory scheme would be
insufficient to fix the Fiduciary Program and then second explores
why, even if an amended statute were passed, the limitations on
judicial review would render the new statute ineffective.
A. The Inadequacies of a Purely Legislative Solution
Congress can reign in agency action by using several techniques,
including oversight hearings to increase public pressure and, when
appropriate, the adoption of new statutes crystallizing congressional
132
expectations. Oversight hearings in this context, however, have
133
made little progress in reforming the Fiduciary Program, prompting
veterans’ advocates to lobby for a new statute. This proposed reform,
despite identifying and attempting to rectify many of the current
problems, will not fix the Fiduciary Program.
After years of encouraging reform and achieving little progress,
several representatives proposed legislation overhauling the Fiduciary
134
Program. A proposed bill, known as the Veterans Fiduciary Reform
135
Act of 2012, stalled in the Senate, but a nearly identical version was
136
revived in the House in 2013. H.R. 894 aims to improve accounting
137
practices and increase transparency in the system. It addresses many

131. Some authors disfavor external review of agency decisionmaking altogether. See
Richard J. Pierce & Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEX.
L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1981) (arguing that “[a]gencies should be scrutinized only to determine
whether the benefit of the administrative program outweighs whatever costs—including those of
capricious action—may be imposed by the inevitable play in the regulatory process”).
132. Edward J. Markey, Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator, Overseer, and
Partner, 1990 DUKE L.J. 967, 971.
133. See supra notes 15−19 and accompanying text.
134. H.R. REP. NO. 112-678, at 14 (2012).
135. H.R. 5948, 112th Cong. (2012).
136. H.R. 894, 113th Cong. (2013).
137. See Press Release, House Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, Miller, Johnson, Roe Introduce
VA Fiduciary Reform Act of 2012 (June 19, 2012), available at http://veterans.house.gov/press-
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of the procedural and discretionary flaws in the Fiduciary Program.
H.R. 894 reduces staff discretion by giving the beneficiary more
authority to designate or remove a fiduciary, makes in-person
interviews and background checks mandatory, and codifies the
previously discretionary preference for appointing a fiduciary
138
designated by a beneficiary. It also standardizes annual accounting
139
reports;
requires fiduciaries to annually report any criminal
convictions, bankruptcy filings, or legal judgments acquired during
the previous year; and requires the Fiduciary Program to transmit the
fiduciary’s annual financial report to the beneficiary and any legal
140
guardian. In an effort to improve monitoring, H.R. 894 requires
each regional office to maintain a list of fiduciaries along with their
personal information, a requirement designed to promote
141
cooperation among regional offices.
Despite proposing essential reforms, H.R. 894 is unlikely to fix
the Fiduciary Program’s flaws. First, there is the practical issue of
political will. Despite almost universal recognition that the Fiduciary
142
Program needs reform, the Veterans Fiduciary Reform Act stalled
143
in the Senate without ever reaching the floor for debate. H.R. 894
has failed to garner even a full vote of the House Committee on
144
Veterans’ Affairs. This stagnation emphasizes the limitations of
congressional action as an effective means to reform administrative
agencies. Beyond this practical limitation, there is the larger issue of
prioritization. The veterans community has limited lobbying
resources, and many of those resources are focused elsewhere. For
145
example, the high suicide rate among disabled veterans and the

release/miller-johnson-roe-introduce-va-fiduciary-reform-act-of-2012 (stating the aims of the
2012 act).
138. H.R. 894, 113th Cong. § 1.
139. See id. (proposing certain requirements for inclusion in annual financial reports in
§ 5509(c)).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See supra Parts II.A–C.
143. See supra note 20.
144. See supra note 22.
145. See Michelle Castillo, Study: Suicide Rates Among Army Soldiers Up 80 Percent, CBS
NEWS (July 10, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/study-suicide-rates-among-army-soldiersup-80-percent.
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massive delays associated with processing VA disability claims
arguably make reform of other VA programs a higher priority for
advocates than reform of the Fiduciary Program. This state of affairs
reveals the other practical danger inherent in relying on Congress to
reform the Program: external support is necessary to motivate
147
political change.
But even if sufficient political will existed to pass the proposed
legislation, the Fiduciary Program’s struggles to comply with its
statutory mandate would continue. First, the legislation is too
ambiguous. For example, the Fiduciary Program would still authorize
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to obtain a fiduciary “in the best
148
interests of a beneficiary” without defining that phrase,
perpetuating the previously discussed problems related to excessive
149
discretion. Similarly, although the proposed statute does explicitly
prefer the beneficiary’s selected fiduciary, the statute still leaves the
150
ultimate determination to the VA.
Political pressure forces
Congress to use very general enabling language in legislation
151
regulating administrative bodies. This language, in turn, makes it
extremely difficult to bind administrative employees, creating
152
logistical difficulties regarding noncompliance.
Second, the proposed legislation does not address the Fiduciary
Program’s underlying problem with employee compliance. As
discussed above, employees are ignoring Program policy at every
stage. During the selection process, investigators frequently disregard
the bonding requirement and the preference for family-member
153
fiduciaries. At the monitoring stage, auditors miss deadlines by
146. Steve Vogel, Veterans Face Another Backlog as a Quarter-Million Appeal Disability
Claims, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2013, 7:52 PM), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0910/politics/41934907_1_veterans-claims-va-secretary-eric-k-veterans-affairs.
147. See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can
Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1381, 1418 (2011) (“Although individual members of Congress frequently write to
agencies on their constituents’ behalf, only when delays begin to affect large numbers of
intended beneficiaries of politically popular programs will Congress begin to hold hearings and
consider imposing statutory deadlines.”).
148. See H.R. 894, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013).
149. See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.
150. See H.R. 894, 113th Cong. § 1 (listing potential fiduciary appointees and directing the
Secretary to select one of the listed options “to the extent possible”).
151. Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 131, at 1197.
152. For further discussion of the difficulties associated with discretionary language, see
infra notes 196–202 and accompanying text.
153. See supra Parts II.A–B.
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weeks and routinely fail to follow documentation requirements.
Agency effectiveness in tackling misuse is even more startling: in 2011
fiduciary personnel conducted only 561 misuse investigations, and
only twenty-five cases (representing less than 5 percent) resulted in
155
the removal of the fiduciary. Lower-level employees are not the
only ones bypassing accountability mechanisms. At the highest level,
leadership within the VA has ignored the legal controls designed to
provide accountability. For example, despite an explicit requirement
that the Fiduciary Program’s central office report misuse to Congress
156
in an Annual Benefits report, the central office failed to report
misuse activities in every year from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year
157
2008. In this light, changes to the text of the statutes authorizing the
Fiduciary Program fail to address this underlying compliance
problem.
Third, legislative efforts to reduce employee discretion might
exacerbate, not remedy, issues regarding noncompliance. A certain
158
amount of discretion is critical for agencies to function effectively.
Considering the complexity of the decisions being made, the
importance of the intangible information gained through personal
visits, and the effect of a determination on the well-being of the
individual beneficiary, some amount of discretion is inevitable and
even preferable. As such, rather than tempering discretion, reform
should focus on establishing effective monitoring by internal and
159
external actors to ensure accountability.
B. Judicial Review: Not a Realistic Reform Tool
Practically speaking, there is little hope that judicial review will
improve the selection or dismissal of fiduciaries. First, Congress
narrowly limits judicial review of fiduciary selection and dismissal to a
single, overwhelmed court for preliminary review. Second, the

154. See supra Part II.C.
155. VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ANNUAL
BENEFITS REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 35 (2012), available at http://www.vba.va.gov/
REPORTS/abr/2011_abr.pdf.
156. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5510(5)–(9) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
157. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 8.
158. See Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 131, at 1178 (arguing “that a certain amount of
discretion is necessary if agencies are to function effectively in a complex society”).
159. Cf. id. at 1180 (“Although an effective regulatory process requires that agencies be
given considerable freedom, the presence of wide administrative discretion increases the
importance of democratic controls over the entire process.”).
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requirements of administrative law funnel all cases through a lengthy
judicial process, forcing beneficiaries to endure years of financial
management by unwanted and potentially abusive fiduciaries.
1. Only One Federal Court Has Jurisdiction To Hear VA-Related
160
Claims. The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act (VJRA) creates a very
specific pipeline for judicial review of claims related to the Fiduciary
Program. Dissatisfied beneficiaries must first appeal the decision to
161
the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA) and then to the CAVC, an
Article I court composed of nine judges appointed for fifteen-year
162
163
terms with exclusive jurisdiction over decisions made by the BVA.
After exhausting both forums, the dissatisfied veteran may then turn
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which can decide
only “relevant questions of law, including interpreting constitutional
164
and statutory provisions,” and then by certiorari to the U.S.
165
Supreme Court.
There are several problems with this form of judicial review.
First, although Congress intended the CAVC to exist independently
166
of the VA, the court frequently serves as a rubber stamp for VA
procedures in practice. The court often remands cases back to the
BVA for further review without reprimand, even in the face of clear
167
evidentiary or procedural issues. For example, consider the case of
Allen and Darren Crenshaw. In February 2012, Darren Crenshaw
160. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
161. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (2006) (subjecting the Secretary’s decisions “to one review on
appeal to the Secretary,” with “[f]inal decisions on such appeals [to] be made by the Board”).
162. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7253(a)–(c) (indicating the name of the court, the number of members,
the length of their terms, and noting that judges are to be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate). Although the court traditionally has seven judges, two
additional judges were authorized in 2008 as part of a temporary expansion provision. Veterans
Benefits Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-389, § 601, 122 Stat. 4145, 4176–77 (codified
at 38 U.S.C. § 7253 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
163. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). The exclusive jurisdiction explicitly includes constitutional
questions. Id. § 7261(a)(1).
164. Id. §§ 7292(a), (c)–(d); see also Chinnock v. Turnage, 995 F.2d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the Ninth Circuit was without jurisdiction to review a VA interpretation of
regulations governing veterans’ “service-connected” disabilities).
165. 38 U.S.C. § 7291.
166. H.R. REP. No. 100-963, at 26 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5808.
167. See James T. O’Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process Is
Needed To Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223, 232–33 (2001) (describing a
pattern of remand without consequence by the CAVC in the face of meaningful error by the
VA).
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was deemed incompetent and in need of a fiduciary. In response,
Allen Crenshaw, Darren’s father and caretaker, sent six letters
requesting his appointment as Darren’s fiduciary, none of which
169
received a response from the VA.
In November 2012, the
Crenshaws, no doubt frustrated with the lack of progress, filed a
petition for a writ of mandamus to the CAVC asking the court to
direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to appoint Allen Crenshaw as
170
Darren’s fiduciary. In response to the petition, the Secretary
introduced a letter stating that a paid fiduciary had been appointed,
though nothing indicated that the letter had ever been sent to the
171
Crenshaws. Despite the Fiduciary Program’s disorganization and
untimeliness, the CAVC explicitly refused to take a position on
whether the VA properly appointed a fiduciary and instead
concluded that the Crenshaws had been afforded sufficient relief
172
because they had the opportunity to appeal the matter to the BVA.
Though the court has raised concerns in the past that the Fiduciary
Program may be incapable of “thoroughly and impartially
investigat[ing] misuse allegations raised by incompetent veterans,”
the CAVC has decided it is “procedurally and jurisdictionally
precluded” from reviewing petitions for mandamus related to
173
challenging misuse allegations,
leaving beneficiaries with few
mechanisms to effectively challenge the selection or dismissal of a
174
fiduciary.
Second, because the CAVC rarely uses the writ of mandamus to
175
bypass the BVA, beneficiaries must endure the grueling wait

168. Crenshaw v. Shinseki, No. 12-3419, 2013 WL 846700, at *1 (Vet. App. Mar. 7, 2013).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at *2.
173. Mimms v. Shinseki, No. 12-2651, 2013 WL 2629248, at *12 (Vet. App. June 12, 2013).
174. Although Freeman v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 404 (2011) (per curiam), is an exception to
this general rule, the CAVC’s language in Mimms reflects a strong preference for rarely using
“the ‘drastic’ remedy of a writ of mandamus.” Mimms, 2013 WL 2629248, at *12. As discussed
above, the CAVC is the only avenue of meaningful appellate review for veterans. See supra
notes 161–65 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Dickson v. West, No. 99-2128, 2000 WL 649170, at *1 (Vet. App. Mar. 21,
2000) (declining to issue a writ of mandamus in a case alleging delay in the appointment of a
replacement fiduciary); Brower v. Nicholson, No. 05-1253, 2005 WL 2105418, at *1 (Vet. App.
July 19, 2005) (declining to issue a writ of mandamus, concluding, instead, that it did not have
authority to review the Secretary’s appointment of a fiduciary); cf., e.g., Willis v. Brown, 6 Vet.
App. 433, 434 (1994) (concluding that the CAVC did not have authority to review the
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associated with filing an initial claim before the BVA. Each year, the
176
BVA, composed of only sixty-four judges, confronts an enormous
177
volume of cases. Because the overloaded BVA plays a critical part
in the appeals process, resolution of any VA claims takes an
incredibly long time. According to the most recent VA figures, a
veteran who appeals to the BVA can expect to wait an average of
1,598 days, with an additional 321 days tacked on if the claim is
178
appealed to the CAVC.
In contrast, according to disability
practitioners, it takes 530 days on average to appeal a decision of the
Social Security Administration (SSA) to an administrative-law judge
and an additional 270 days to appeal that determination to the Social
179
Security Appeals Council. By routing fiduciary selection and
180
removal issues through this type of lengthy process, beneficiaries
must wait years to give control over their financial assets to their
preferred fiduciaries.
Third, fiduciaries cannot even hire lawyers to defend their rights
until the case has been appealed. Federal law prohibits veterans from
181
hiring attorneys prior to the filing of the notice of disagreement, the
182
document that initiates the appeal. Moreover, any fees paid to an

Secretary’s appointment of a fiduciary). But see Freeman v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 404 (2011)
(per curiam).
176. BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE
CHAIRMAN: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 3, available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_
Annual_Rpts/BVA2012AR.pdf. In contrast, there are more than sixteen hundred
administrative-law judges. ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES, http://www.aalj.org (last visited Feb. 9,
2014).
177. Petitioners filed 45,959 cases in fiscal year 2012. The most recent BVA estimates
project that appealed cases could increase to 54,033 in 2013 and 64,941 in 2014. BD. OF
VETERANS’ APPEALS, supra note 176, at 16, 20.
178. Vogel, supra note 146. These wait times are expected to increase as resources are
shifted away from resolving appeals to addressing the backlog related to disability claims. Id.
179. The Social Security Disability Appeals Process, MARC WHITEHEAD & ASSOCS.,
http://www.disabilitydenials.com/social-security-disability-appeals-process (last visited Feb. 9,
2014).
180. The exclusive jurisdiction of the CAVC may also extend to suits for negligence against
the VA. See Lujan v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, No. 2:09CV56, 2009 WL 2920341, at *2 (D. Utah
Sept. 11, 2009) (holding that claims under 38 U.S.C. § 6107 fall within the exclusivity of the
VJRA). For further discussion of the negligence cause of action against the VA, see supra notes
59–60 and accompanying text.
181. 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (2006) (“[A] fee may not be charged, allowed, or paid for
services of agents and attorneys with respect to services provided before the date on which a
notice of disagreement is filed with respect to the case.”).
182. The notice of disagreement is discussed in further detail in the VA Adjudication
Procedures Manual Rewrite. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, M21-1MR,
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attorney during the appellate process must be approved by the VA.
Although the Supreme Court has found the fee limitation
184
constitutional, the practical effect of this law is to deny attorneys the
opportunity to preserve the appellate record or counsel veteran
clients prior to filing the complaint, leaving veterans to navigate an
extremely complicated legal system either pro se or based on the
185
generosity of lawyers. This is especially troubling when the VA
attempts to use complicated jurisdictional arguments to deny
beneficiaries a forum to challenge the selection of a fiduciary. In
186
Freeman v. Shinseki, the legal counsel for the VA argued that the
CAVC did not have jurisdiction to review decisions related to the
187
appointment of a veteran’s fiduciary. Yet the court noted that the
VA legal counsel had previously won motions to dismiss in cases in
which a beneficiary challenged the selection of a fiduciary in federal
courts by arguing that only the CAVC had jurisdiction over these
188
cases. By playing both sides of the field, the VA functionally denied
beneficiaries any opportunity to appeal the selection of the person
designated to manage his financial resources. Although Freeman v.
Shinseki resolved this jurisdictional issue by finally giving the
189
beneficiary the right to appeal the appointment of a fiduciary, the
willingness of the VA to use jurisdictional arguments to avoid judicial

COMPENSATION AND PENSION MANUAL REWRITE, pt. I, ch. 5, § B, available at
http://www.benefits.va.gov/WARMS/docs/admin21/m21_1/mr/part1/M21-1MRI_5_SecB.doc.
183. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5904(c)(2)–(3). To receive fees, an attorney must file an application under
the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)–(2) (2012), proving that the attorney
(1) is a prevailing party; (2) has a net worth less than $2,000,000; and (3) provided an itemized
statement of the attorney fees and expenses sought. The attorney must also prove that the
Secretary’s position was not substantially justified. Id.; see also Wilbon v. Shinseki, No. 111908(E), 2012 WL 1058939, at *2 (Vet. App. Mar. 30, 2012) (denying attorneys’ fees because the
petitioner was not a prevailing party when the agency changed its petition in favor of the
veteran while the petition for writ of mandamus was pending).
184. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326 (1985) (“It would
take an extraordinarily strong showing of probability of error under the present system—and
the probability that the presence of attorneys would sharply diminish that possibility—to
warrant a holding that the fee limitation denies claimants due process of law. . . . [N]o such
showing was made out on the record before the District Court.”).
185. See Benjamin W. Wright, It’s All About the Money: Denying Disabled Veterans the
Right to an Attorney, 6 NAELA J. 203, 211 (2010).
186. Freeman v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 404 (2011) (per curiam).
187. Id. at 408.
188. Id. at 407 (citing Judkins v. Veterans Admin., 415 F. Supp. 2d 613, 617–18 (E.D.N.C.
2005); Carney v. G.I. Jane, No. Civ. A. B-03-173, 2005 WL 2277490, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16,
2005); Whitmire v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 661 F. Supp. 720, 722 (W.D. Wash. 1986)).
189. Freeman, 24 Vet. App. at 416–17.
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review of the Fiduciary Program undermines the working assumption
that the VA always protects the interest of veterans.
2. Administrative Law Bars Judicial Review. In addition to a
limited and narrowly construed forum for judicial review, several
principles of administrative law bar the CAVC from reviewing the
decisions of the Fiduciary Program on the merits in a timely
190
manner.
First, the CAVC can rely on the doctrine of administrative
exhaustion to refrain from reviewing challenges to the selection of
fiduciaries when the arguments were not previously raised. The
doctrine of exhaustion prohibits an appeal based on certain
challenges and arguments when “the appellant has failed to present
those challenges and arguments, either expressly or implicitly, to the
191
Board.” Despite the Federal Circuit’s determination that the BVA
must read all filings liberally whether or not the veteran is
192
represented by counsel, the CAVC often invokes the exhaustion
193
doctrine to refuse to entertain newly raised arguments.
The finality requirement imposes an alternative bar against
raising challenges to the Fiduciary Program’s selection or removal of
a fiduciary. To obtain review by the CAVC, the BVA must issue a
194
final decision following the notice of disagreement. As a result, the
CAVC routinely denies petitions for extraordinary relief that
challenge the selection or removal of a fiduciary on the basis that the
BVA has not yet issued a final decision on the status of the
195
fiduciary. These denials force petitioners back into the queue where
they must wait for several years while a stranger manages their
money.

190. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012),
applies to the Veterans Administration. See Castellano v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 146, 150
(2011).
191. Van Alstine v. Principi, No. 99-1322, 2002 WL 31757849, at *4 (Vet. App. July 26, 2002)
(quoting Stuckey v. West, 13 Vet. App. 163, 174 (1999), withdrawn Stuckey v. Principi, No. 961373 (Vet. App. Jan. 24, 2001)). For a more comprehensive discussion of issue exhaustion, see
generally Gary E. O’Connor, Did Decide or Should Have Decided: Issue Exhaustion and the
Veterans Benefits Appeals Process, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1279 (2000).
192. Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
193. E.g., Owens v. Shinseki, No. 12-1626, 2013 WL 3283492, at *6 (Vet. App. June 28,
2013); Gibbons v. Shinseki, No. 11-2662, 2012 WL 6651974, at * 7 (Vet. App. Dec. 21, 2012).
194. 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (2006).
195. E.g., Evans v. Shinseki, No. 12-1023, 2012 WL 1560379, at *2–3 (Vet. App. May 4,
2012).
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Finally, considering the substantial flexibility afforded to
investigators and auditors by the Manual, the standards used to
review large portions of the Program remain unclear. For example,
take the VA policies regarding the appointment of fiduciaries:
Federal law allows the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to pay benefits
to a fiduciary “[w]here it appears to the Secretary that the interest of
196
the beneficiary would be served.” This discretion is carried over into
the regulations and guidelines, which encourage the investigator to
focus on the “best interest of the beneficiary” in appointing a
197
fiduciary. And the Manual indicates that VA employees should
determine “the type of fiduciary relationship that will best serve the
needs of the beneficiary,” a determination that employees might
make by reference to a VA policy prioritizing (1) the beneficiary’s
preference; (2) the beneficiary’s spouse, if available; (3) a family
member, friend, or other individual willing to serve without a fee; and
198
(4) a paid stranger.
In this example, even assuming that Program determinations
such as those about the “best interest of the beneficiary” in
199
appointing a fiduciary are reviewable, the CAVC has yet to
determine how it will treat such discretionary portions of the Manual
and implementing directives. There is precedent suggesting that some
portions of the Manual sufficiently restrict VA discretion to be
200
considered legislative rules that substantively bind the VA.
Additionally, the CAVC has previously held that “the mere existence
of some discretion is not sufficient . . . for a rule to be classified as a
201
general statement of policy” or an interpretative rule. These
distinctions would most likely affect the level of deference courts

196. 38 U.S.C. § 5502(a)(1).
197. See supra note 47. For other regulatory constraints on the selection of a fiduciary, see
supra note 71.
198. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
199. The CAVC has determined that the Program’s statutory and regulatory standards are
sufficient to permit judicial review of the selections of fiduciaries. Freeman v. Shinseki, 24 Vet.
App. 404, 411, 413–14 (2011) (per curiam).
200. See Fugere v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 103, 106–07 (1990) (considering an earlier version
of the Compensation and Pension Manual Rewrite and reaching this conclusion); see also
Morton v. West, 13 Vet. App. 205, 206–07 (1999) (relying on substantive rules in the
Compensation and Pension Manual related to the VA duty to assist); cf. Buzinski v. Brown, 6
Vet. App. 360, 69 (1994) (noting that VA directives are binding only to the extent they
“prescribe substantive rules—not interpretive rules” (quotation marks omitted)).
201. Morton, 13 Vet. App. 208–09 (quoting Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).

BOSWORTH IN PP (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

1532

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/16/2014 8:21 PM

[Vol. 63:1503

would afford the agency in evaluating whether employees complied
202
with the standard.
Judicial challenge may very well remain open to plaintiffbeneficiaries. For instance, if a court were to hold that portions of the
203
Manual, fast letters, or other subregulatory directives were binding
legislative rules, rather than general statements of policy or
interpretative rules, it could raise questions about whether they need
204
to go through the process of notice and comment. Similarly,
although plaintiffs have (so far unsuccessfully) challenged the VA’s
fiduciary-appointment procedures on due process grounds, at least
205
one court remains open to considering this potential argument.
These issues, in conjunction with the significant procedural hurdles
discussed above, will most likely play a substantial role in future
206
litigation by plaintiff-beneficiaries.
IV. THE SOLUTION: INTERNAL REFORM AND EXTERNAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
As neither adopting a new statute nor litigating the application
of the Fiduciary Program in the current judicial system will provide
relief, this Note advocates turning to other mechanisms for reform.
This Note recommends two reforms: (1) the Fiduciary Program
202. When reviewed by a court, legislative rules will get Chevron deference, whereas
interpretive rules will get Skidmore deference. Jamie A. Yavelberg, The Revival of Skidmore v.
Swift: Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations After EEOC v. ARAMCO, 42 DUKE L.J.
166, 174–75 (1992). Despite this precedent, the CAVC has not yet determined whether the
discretionary portions of the Manual are legislative or interpretive. For more information on
interpretative rules, see generally Thomas J. Fraser, Interpretive Rules: Can the Amount of
Deference Accorded Them Offer Insight into the Procedural Inquiry?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1303
(2010).
203. For discussion of these subregulatory directives, see supra notes 33–40 and
accompanying text.
204. Cf. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112–13 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (holding that the APA requires that legislative rules be submitted for comment and
distinguishing between legislative and interpretive rules). To the extent these subregulatory
directives in fact cabin agency discretion, they would seem to clash with 38 C.F.R. § 19.5, which
indicates that “the Board [of Veterans’ Appeals] . . . is not bound by Department manuals,
circulars, or similar administrative issues.” 38 C.F.R. § 19.5 (2013); cf. Am. Mining Cong., 955
F.2d at 1112 (noting that a rule is not interpretive to the extent it “repudiates or is irreconcilable
with an existing legislative rule”).
205. See Solze v. Shinseki, No. 12,1512, 2012 WL 4801411, at *6 (Vet. App. Oct. 10, 2012)
(ordering the Secretary of Veterans Affairs “to show cause as to why the Court should not
determine that his actions violated [the plaintiff]’s right to due process under the Fifth
Amendment”); infra note 216.
206. See supra notes 181–89 and accompanying text.
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should make specific changes intended to address internal problems,
and (2) the Fiduciary Program should rely on third parties to provide
independent monitoring that will ensure compliance with Program
regulations.
A. Internal Reform
Some of the most important changes to the Fiduciary Program
must be tackled internally. The Program can make significant
progress by improving its management structure and taking steps to
provide staff with key resources. Such changes would go a long way
toward improving policy compliance and efficiency. By identifying
these issues and proposing reasonable modifications to address
particular problems, this Note aims to make reform a tangible
possibility.
1. National Standards. The Fiduciary Program should develop
national performance standards to ensure consistent performance
across regional offices. According to the VA OIG, regional offices
performed substantially better at securing delinquent accountings
when management consistently conducted local quality reviews,
reviewed available management reports, and assisted employees with
207
case. Moreover, whereas some regional offices failed to verify
questionable expenses in 47 percent of their case reviews, other
208
regional offices produced zero errors. This huge performance gap
suggests that the Fiduciary Program is working effectively in at least
some of the regional offices and that those with high error rates could
benefit from emulating the processes adopted by these successful
offices. By implementing the techniques employed by successful
regional offices at a national level, the Fiduciary Program could
improve across-the-board performance.
Effective national standards also require accurate performance
measures. As the business world has long recognized, “What you
209
measure is what you get” —quality performance measures are the
key to superior staff performance. As such, the Fiduciary Program
needs to synchronize performance measures with the Program’s
objectives. For example, despite the importance of investigating

207. See OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 3–4.
208. Id. at 4.
209. Robert S. Kaplan & David P. Norton, The Balanced Scorecard—Measures That Drive
Performance, HARVARD BUS. REV., Jan.−Feb. 1992, at 71, 71.
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misuse allegations, the Fiduciary Program currently does not hold
staff responsible for the timely and thorough processing of misuse
210
allegations. Changing performance standards to evaluate individual
employee follow-up on misuse allegations would incentivize
timeliness and would encourage management to identify
noncompliant employees, thereby improving the likelihood that staff
211
will observe internal policies.
Those performance standards already in existence should be
reviewed for effectiveness. By making performance expectations
more accurate, the Fiduciary Program would ensure that employees
select qualified fiduciaries and would promote more effective
monitoring. In addition to improving performance quality, reforming
expectations may decrease the strain on staff associated with
212
unrealistic deadlines, thereby reducing the likelihood of burnout by
qualified examiners and auditors in the Fiduciary Program.
Regularly updated guidelines would also aid in the development
of realistic national standards. Because other parts of the VA have
213
already adopted updated and clear regulations, the Fiduciary
Program would be unlikely to face substantial resistance should it
follow suit—and the January 3, 2014 proposed rule suggests that new
214
regulations may be forthcoming.
Finally, national standards require the development of
streamlined processes. For example, instead of asking an incompetent
beneficiary to designate a preferred fiduciary during the
215
investigation, the Fiduciary Program could consider asking older

210. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 6.
211. See id. (noting that “VARO management said non-compliance by some VAROs was
due to the lack of effective oversight and training of fiduciary staff,” and that “processing
allegations of misuse is not part of the agency’s performance measures or part of staff and
management performance standards,” nor was it “included in national quality reviews, which
may provide a lack of incentive for VBA staff to thoroughly and timely review and investigate
misuse allegations”).
212. Cf. Jill Kickul & Margaret Posig, Supervisory Emotional Support and Burnout: An
Explanation of Reverse Buffering Effects, 13 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 328, 338–39 (2001)
(describing the effect of unrealistic performance standards on employee performance).
213. See William L. Pine & William F. Russo, Making Veterans Benefits Clear: VA’s
Regulation Rewrite Project, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 407, 409–10 (2009) (discussing the VA’s Rewrite
Project, which was an effort to reform regulations on the VA’s compensation and pension
benefits programs).
214. The VA proposed to amend the Fiduciary Program regulations, opening the
amendment for comment on January 3, 2014. Fiduciary Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 430 (proposed
Jan. 3, 2014) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pts. 3 and 13).
215. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § D.11.c.
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veterans to routinely identify their preferred fiduciary every three to
five years, thereby reducing the difficulties inherent in selecting an
appropriate fiduciary and increasing the likelihood that the selected
fiduciary is someone the beneficiary would have chosen. Additionally,
despite the concerns of the VA, the Fiduciary Program should
seriously consider the benefits of recognizing a preselected fiduciary
already designated by the beneficiary to possess a power of attorney
216
(POA). Though the VA is absolutely correct in asserting that an
individual with a POA should not be considered to the exclusion of
all other candidates for fear that the document will bypass some of
217
the Fiduciary Program’s most important safety features, a POA is a
strong indicator of a beneficiary’s preferences and should be given
some weight. At minimum then, the Program should develop a
comprehensive process for approving or rejecting potential fiduciaries
who already possess a POA.
2. Training. Staff at every level would benefit from more
rigorous training. Studies conclude that leadership training has a
218
positive impact on the effectiveness of organizations at every level.

216. In Solze v. Shinseki, No. 12-1512, 2012 WL 3108837 (Aug. 1, 2012) (per curiam), the
CAVC ordered argument be prepared on whether the VA is constitutionally or statutorily
obligated to accept a durable POA as sufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship. Id. at *2; see
also Solze v. Shinseki, No. 12,1512, 2012 WL 4801411, at *6 (Vet. App. Oct. 10, 2012) (ordering
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs “to show cause as to why the Court should not determine that
his actions violated [the plaintiff]’s right to due process under the Fifth Amendment”).
Although the court ultimately did not have occasion to rule on the issue, it noted congressional
concern with the VA’s apparent failure to give effect to its “policy . . . that they prefer family
members and friends to serve as fiduciaries.” Solze v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 118, 126 n.13
(2013) (quoting Reforming VA’s Flawed Fiduciary System, supra note 17, at 2 (statement of
Rep. Bill Johnson, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations)). But see Reforming
VA’s Flawed Fiduciary System, supra note 17, at 10 (statement of David McLenachen, Director
of Pension and Fiduciary Service, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs) (arguing against reliance on a
POA).
217. Reforming VA’s Flawed Fiduciary System, supra note 17, at 10 (statement of David
McLenachen, Director of Pension and Fiduciary Service, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs).
218. See Laura L. Methot, W. Larry Williams, Anne Cummings & Beth Bradshaw,
Measuring the Effects of a Manager-Supervisor Training Program Through the Generalized
Performance of Managers, Supervisors, Front-Line Staff and Clients in a Human Service Setting,
16 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. MGMT. 3, 20–21 (1996) (“[A] cost-effective supervisor training
intervention can influence the supervisory process with effects that, in some cases, influence[]
performance at other levels in the organization.”); Carol Woltring, Wendy Constantine & Liz
Schwarte, Does Leadership Training Make a Difference? The CDU/UC Public Health
Leadership Institute: 1991–1999, 9 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. 111, 125 (2003) (concluding
that training provided by the Leadership Health Institute was successful “in enhancing the
leadership capacities of senior public health leaders”).
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Fiduciary Program managers, the first line of defense against groundstaff noncompliance, have received training from the central office
only three times since 1987 and have received no training since
219
2004. Moreover, Fiduciary Program employees often attribute their
220
noncompliance with Program guidelines to inexperience.
By
providing formal training for subject-matter experts, including the
opportunity to work on mock cases, conduct practice interviews, and
221
work on live cases under direct supervision, the Fiduciary Program
could eliminate ignorance as an explanation for staff noncompliance.
3. Adopting Strategies Used by Other Agencies. The Fiduciary
Program should learn from other federal agencies that perform
similar functions. First, the Fiduciary Program should guide
investigators who select surety bonds by emulating the Department of
Labor, which requires all bonds used by ERISA fiduciaries to be
222
provided by a surety approved by the Department of the Treasury.
By adopting the approach employed by the Department of Labor and
requiring employees to adhere to only those preapproved sureties,
the Fiduciary Program would reduce workload requirements by
minimizing the time an employee would need to spend searching for
an appropriate bonding agency. This improvement, in turn, would
free up time for employees to focus on other issues.
Second, the Fiduciary Program should copy the SSA by selecting
a private company to perform credit and background checks. In
response to a similar problem, the SSA hired Dunn & Bradstreet, a
professional credit-check company, to perform background credit
223
checks on all fiduciaries receiving a commission. The Fiduciary
219. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 13.
220. See id. at 17 (noting that in two of the three regional offices visited by the GAO, only
33 percent of the staff had more than two years of experience).
221. See Examining the Fiduciary Program, supra note 17, at 22 (statement of Katherine R.
Pflanz, Field Examiner, Winston-Salem Veterans Affairs Regional Office) (discussing the use of
these methods in the training for her position as a veteran-service representative, as compared
to the training she received as a field examiner for the fiduciary unit, where “formal training is
not available”).
222. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN, NO. 2008-04, GUIDANCE
REGARDING ERISA FIDELITY BONDING REQUIREMENTS 3 (2008), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fab2008-4.pdf. For the Department of the Treasury’s list of
acceptable sureties, see Department of the Treasury’s Listing of Certified Companies, FIN.
MGMT. SERV. (July 23, 2013), http://www.fms.treas.gov/c570/C570-certified-comp-07-012013.pdf.
223. Ensuring the Integrity of Social Security Programs: Protecting Seniors from
Representative Payee Fraud: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 14 (2003)
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Program should contract with a similar company to provide credit
checks and background checks. Consistently using the same neutral
party could economize the costs of contracting through a volume
discount and increase the accuracy of the provided information by
eliminating the opportunity for the fiduciary-applicant to lie.
The Fiduciary Program should also adopt the SSA’s requirement
that potential fiduciaries visit the local office. By shifting the travel
224
burden from a Program employee to a potential fiduciary, the
Fiduciary Program could decrease the commute time for employees,
freeing up time to focus on other tasks.
4. Use of Technology. Already in the works for processing
225
disability claims, a shift to a paperless tracking system would make
it easier for employees to perform and for managers to review staff
performance. For example, a paperless tracking system could include
the ability to transmit and receive electronic accountings from
fiduciaries, review previous accountings with a click of the mouse,
access old records, and manage case files. In fact, since other agencies
in the federal government are already using private companies to
226
facilitate the transition into the digital era, such a change would be
unlikely to face internal resistance if adopted by the Fiduciary
Program. Moreover, an electronic database system set to save and
back up data would help prevent the loss of important case data,
thereby reducing the number of files without documentation and
increasing compliance with the Fiduciary Program’s documentation
policies.
B. External Review
Considering the host of problems plaguing the Fiduciary
Program, many would expect reform to be a hot-button issue inside
(statement of Frederick G. Streckewald, Assistant Deputy Comm’r, Social Security
Administration). For articles discussing the SSA’s payee program, see supra note 23.
224. For discussion of current travel expectations for investigators, see supra note 123 and
accompanying text.
225. See Emily Woodward Deutsch & Terrence T. Griffin, Parsing the Paperless Push: A
Study of the Latest Efforts To Automate the Veterans’ Claims Process, 2 VETERANS L. REV. 117,
126−29 (2010) (discussing the movement toward a paperless system as a solution to the backlog
of claims).
226. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., A-04-08-18066,
CONTRACT WITH LOCKHEED MARTIN GOVERNMENT SERVICES, INC. FOR DIGITAL IMAGING
SERVICES: AUDIT REPORT (2008), available at http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/
pdf/A-04-08-18066_7.pdf (discussing the transition to digital files in the SSA).
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the Fiduciary Program’s management structure. In reality, senior
management frequently overstates the Fiduciary Program’s successes
and undermines the need for reform, promising change but rarely
delivering. For instance, the VA OIG recommended that the
Fiduciary Program develop a new version of the FBS and the
Fiduciary Program concurred, promising that a workgroup would
227
present its findings and recommendations by June 2010. As of
March 2014, no record of a workgroup meeting could be found and
no electronic database appears to be in the works. Similarly, after
Congress demanded better training, the Fiduciary Program conducted
228
a centralized pilot training program in 2011 but made no further
progress implementing the training nationwide. The Fiduciary
Program’s struggles to make important changes suggest that some
sort of external accountability is needed to ensure forward progress.
This Note proposes that the best source for this external
accountability derives not from traditional third parties such as
Congress or the CAVC, but rather from alternative third parties.
Third-party monitoring would increase the number of watchful eyes
229
looking for indicators of misuse. This Note advocates for third-party
participation at the federal and state levels through cooperation
among federal agencies, parallel state-law enforcement, and vigorous
litigation by veterans’ advocates.
First, other federal agencies dealing with the same or similar
situations could provide the Fiduciary Program with a second layer of
accountability. The most obvious option is the SSA, specifically the
branch of the agency called the Representative Payee Program.
Although the SSA operates the Representative Payee Program under
230
different federal law, this SSA program performs basically the same
function as the VA’s Fiduciary Program, just under the direction of a
231
different administrative agency. Both programs share the same
basic mandate, and the programs sometimes have incapacitated
227. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 31–32.
228. Reforming VA’s Flawed Fiduciary System, supra note 17, at 6 (testimony of David
McLenachen, Director of Pension and Fiduciary Service, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs).
229. Cf. Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698,
701−03 (2011) (discussing the benefits of state enforcement of federal law).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 1007 (2006).
231. GAO, INCAPACITATED ADULTS, supra note 18, at 3; see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, MANAGING SOMEONE ELSE’S MONEY: HELP FOR REPRESENTATIVE PAYEES AND
VA FIDUCIARIES 8 (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_
lay_fiduciary_guides_representative.pdf (treating fiduciaries and representative payees
similarly).
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232

beneficiaries in common.
Creating an information exchange
between the SSA and the VA for joint fiduciaries would improve
monitoring and facilitate more accurate information about potential
233
fiduciaries.
Second, state law should also be utilized as an independent check
on the performance of fiduciaries by providing a secondary
234
mechanism to address fiduciary fraud. Most states provide a
235
common-law civil remedy for a breach of a fiduciary duty, and some
states have even enacted specific statutory language addressing
236
abuses of the fiduciary relationship. Although there are few cases in
which a beneficiary successfully sues his fiduciary for breach of
fiduciary duty or fraud, at least one state court has entertained such a
237
suit. Moreover, rather than rubberstamping the VA’s choice of
fiduciaries, state courts could rely on state-law requirements for
238
guardians to bar the selection of unqualified VA fiduciaries. States
could also modify criminal statutes to explicitly penalize VA
fiduciaries for stealing from beneficiaries. Although some states
239
already penalize financial exploitation of the elderly or the disabled,
codifying a specific crime related to exploitation of incompetent
beneficiaries as identified by the VA could serve as a jurisdictional
hook for state prosecution of fraudulent fiduciaries. Such criminal
provisions, in turn, could allow states to protect incompetent veterans
concurrently with the federal government, thereby providing

232. GAO, INCAPACITATED ADULTS, supra note 18, at 11.
233. Id.
234. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979) (violation of a fiduciary duty). For
a general description of Restatement section 87, see Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary
Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925,
927–34 (2006).
235. See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit §§ 34–39 (2013) (discussing fiduciary fraud in
depth).
236. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 29-5-93 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 356A.09 (West
2012).
237. See Conservatorship Estate of K.H. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 73 P.3d 588, 589 (Alaska 2003)
(allowing the beneficiary’s new fiduciary to sue the old fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty
and fraud). These suits may not be very popular because the fraudulent fiduciaries lack
resources to justify the expense of the suit.
238. See, e.g., Estate of Dickson, No. DP-92-56, 1998 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 850, at *12–13 (Jud.
Dist. Ct. Mont. Dec. 4, 1998) (refusing to grant “sham appointments of conservators” proposed
by the VA).
239. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/17-56 (Supp. 2013).
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240

substantial enforcement benefits. Whether or not federal law
241
preempts state enforcement of these suits is still a matter of debate.
These concerns, however, may be alleviated if the agency has already
242
identified that a fraud has occurred.
Third, it is important to remember that new sources of external
accountability should not replace traditional mechanisms of private
enforcement. Veterans’ advocates must continue to advance the
interests of incompetent beneficiaries. First, there is the possibility of
raising a system-wide challenge to the Fiduciary Program’s lack of
procedure. The Ninth Circuit, in Veterans for Common Sense v.
243
Shinseki, held that the VJRA did not bar organizational plaintiffs
from challenging the absence of system-wide procedures used by the
VA to select and monitor fiduciaries, procedures which would be
244
necessary for due process. Although an individual veteran can use
the judicial mechanism defined by the VJRA, organizational plaintiffs
cannot bring suit in the CAVC, and that court cannot claim exclusive
245
jurisdiction over the suit. Though this theory has yet to be tested in
the context of the Fiduciary Program, an organizational claim could
provide veterans’ advocates with a mechanism to challenge the entire
Program in one instance and outside the CAVC pipeline. Second, the
negligence cause of action provided under federal law could be used
to address the very types of abuse that are so problematic in the
246
Fiduciary Program. Between 2008 and 2012, however, a VA
spokesperson indicated that only fifteen beneficiaries have been
247
compensated under that cause of action. The Fiduciary Program
disfavors reimbursements, forcing advocates to fight tooth-and-nail to
240. See Lemos, supra note 229, at 717−36 (discussing the benefits of state enforcement as
compared to federal enforcement).
241. See Louis M. Bograd & Andre M. Mura, Buckman Stops Here! Limits on Preemption
of State Tort Claims Involving Allegations of Fraud on the PTO or the FDA, 41 RUTGERS L.J.
309, 309–10 (2009) (arguing that federal law should not preempt plaintiffs’ state-law claims
“[w]here plaintiffs allege, and can offer evidence of, fraud on [an agency] plus all of the
necessary elements of a traditional state-law cause,” but that claims may be preempted “where
plaintiffs nakedly allege fraud on the agency, without the essential elements of a recognized
state-law claim”).
242. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. 841 (2008) (arguing that allowing state enforcement when the agency identifies fraud
should alleviate preemption concerns).
243. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012).
244. Id. at 1034–35.
245. Id. at 1035.
246. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
247. Nalder & Olsen, supra note 105.
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prove jurisdiction; for this reason, the system’s ultimate efficacy
requires the work of diligent advocates who are willing to push back
248
against the decisions made by Fiduciary Program employees. In
addition to providing beneficiaries with an alternative way to recover
lost money, especially when the fiduciary failed to acquire a surety
bond, increased negligence suits could place a much-needed spotlight
on the Fiduciary Program’s struggles.
CONCLUSION
The Fiduciary Program was developed to protect those who
sacrificed so much to guard the United States and who now, due to
disease, illness, or infirmity, cannot protect themselves. As long as the
Fiduciary Program continues in its current state, however,
incompetent beneficiaries will remain susceptible to abuse by
unsavory fiduciaries. Neither Congress nor the CAVC can effectively
remedy this program. Instead, other actors must step up to make the
Fiduciary Program function effectively. To facilitate actual
improvement, the Fiduciary Program should adopt institutional
reforms that address the underlying management and resource issues
preventing compliance with Program regulations, and, in the process,
it should also adopt new mechanisms to clarify internal policies.
Additionally, external entities, such as other federal agencies and the
states, must be given a seat at the table to provide additional
oversight to ensure Program compliance. Only a system that
prioritizes internal reform and encourages external accountability will
be able to fulfill the Fiduciary Program’s mandate: protecting the
most vulnerable members of the veteran population from abuse.

248. See Freeman v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 404, 405–06 (2011) (per curiam) (noting the
jurisdictional hurdles advocates had to surmount to establish jurisdiction in any court).

